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MURKY MATERIALITY & SCATTERED
STANDARDS: IN FAVOR OF A MORE UNIFORM
SYSTEM OF SST DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
Megan Ganley*
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires corporations to
disclose their business in or with state sponsors of terrorism (SSTs). The
SEC solicits these disclosures with varying standards arising under several
different mechanisms. These mechanisms include the requirements of the
materiality standard, the provisions of Regulation S-K, targeted inquiry in
individually issued comment letters, and affirmative requirements mandated
under specific legislation. Each of these mechanisms requires disclosure of
slightly different information regarding SSTs with varying degrees of
exactitude.
This Note examines the SEC’s current SST disclosure framework,
considering the benefits, as well as the criticisms, of these disclosure
mandates. This Note concludes that, although SST disclosure mandates are
important, the mechanisms in place result in inconsistent disclosure that
renders the entire framework ineffective. This Note argues that a more
consistent SST disclosure standard is needed and proposes the addition of a
new line item to Regulation S-K mandating that companies disclose all of
their business in or with SSTs.
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INTRODUCTION
Few concepts seem as unrelated as Barbie Dolls and terrorism.
Nevertheless, when a news article reported that shops in Iran were selling
Barbies, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) wrote to Mattel,
the manufacturer of Barbies, due to Iran’s status as a state sponsor of
terrorism (SST).1 The SEC requested that Mattel provide an update on its
1. See Comment Letter from Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Linda
Cvrkel, Effie Simpson, & Jennifer Hardy, Mattel, Inc. 1–2 (Apr. 30, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/63276/000119312512196514/filename1.htm
[https://perma.cc/2WKT-LPQ6].
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contacts with Iran, as the company’s prior disclosures did not include
statements regarding the country.2 In response, Mattel replied that, although
the company was aware of a series of press articles reporting that Iranian
police had closed down stores selling Barbies, any sale in Iran was “contrary
to Mattel corporate policy,” and the dolls were either counterfeit or sold
unlawfully by a third party.3 This correspondence exemplifies SST
disclosure efforts by the SEC.
The SEC is a government agency that was founded at the height of the
Great Depression4 with a mission to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly,
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”5 The SEC regulates
financial markets6 by enforcing the federal securities laws—laws rooted in a
mandatory disclosure regime.7 Under this disclosure regime, companies are
generally required to disclose information that is material.8
SEC disclosure requirements occasionally extend beyond exclusively
financial information and into nonfinancial activities.9
Sometimes,
nonfinancial information is considered material because of its inherent
financial impact;10 other times, targeted regulatory requirements mandate
disclosure of nonfinancial information through legislation and other
mechanisms.11 This Note focuses on just one type of information that must
be disclosed: activities in or with nations designated as SSTs.12 These
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/CKC2-NFCV] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
5. See Robert Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure and SEC Financial
Reporting Oversight 6 (Sept. 8, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Hills et al., State
Sponsors
of
Terrorism
Disclosure],
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3592694
[https://perma.cc/P64R-2W2B].
6. Robert Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial
Reporting Oversight?, COLUMBIA BLUE SKY BLOG (May 19, 2020) [hereinafter Hills et al.,
Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial Reporting Oversight?],
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/05/19/does-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-disclosurelimit-sec-financial-reporting-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/S9CK-KCRF].
7. See Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the
Over-the-Counter Market, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 213–14 (2007); see also Donald C.
Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1639, 1640 (2019).
8. See Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy,
35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 98–99 (2014) (“The mandatory disclosure obligation under U.S.
federal securities law is circumscribed by the principle of materiality. Under this principle, a
company must only disclose a given piece of information if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor would deem it significant in the ‘total mix’ of available
information—i.e., what an ordinary, rational investor would consider important information
in an arm’s length securities transaction.”); infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the materiality standard
in greater depth).
9. See Park, supra note 8, at 98.
10. See infra Part II.B.1.
11. See Park, supra note 8, at 98, 102–03; infra Part I.B.4.
12. Although the list has fluctuated over the years, it presently includes North Korea, Iran,
Syria, and Cuba. Compare Bureau of Counterterrorism, State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/5UCF-
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disclosures are in part required pursuant to specific legislation,13 but they are
largely solicited under the general framework of the materiality requirement
and Regulation S-K.14 The aforementioned letter issued by the SEC to Mattel
regarding Barbie sales is a typical example of the SEC’s efforts to solicit SST
disclosures through targeted inquiry via comment letters.15
This Note analyzes the methods the SEC currently uses to generate SST
disclosures and considers whether these methods function effectively to
provide necessary information to the investors who benefit from corporate
disclosure requirements.16 Part I discusses the SST designation process
before describing the four principal mechanisms the SEC uses to solicit SST
disclosures. Part II then assesses whether current SST disclosure practices
are beneficial, worthwhile, and effective. Finally, Part III proposes an
addition to Regulation S-K that seeks to enhance the uniformity of
information that companies must disclose regarding their interactions in or
with SSTs.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: SST DESIGNATION AND SEC REGULATION
As mentioned above, companies doing business with SSTs are regulated
by a host of disclosure requirements.17 Before considering mechanisms of
soliciting SST disclosures, it is useful to survey the legal landscape
explaining how and why countries become designated as SSTs. Part I.A
examines the current SST designation protocol and identifies the countries
designated as SSTs. Part I.B explores the various SST disclosure
requirements that apply to corporations doing business with these countries.
A. Defining and Designating SSTs
A country’s designation as an SST is important to the SEC because the
designation triggers SST disclosure requirements for companies.18 However,
C5V3] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021), with Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP,
Preparing Your 2017 Form 20-F (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.davispolk.com/sites/
default/files/2017-12-14_preparing_your_2017_form_20-f.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3KA3MSY] (demonstrating the changing designations over time).
13. See infra Part I.B.4 (discussing disclosure requirements under the ITRA).
14. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing SST disclosure requirements under the materiality
standard).
15. See supra note 1; Part I.B.3.
16. Although this Note considers a variety of positions, including those of reporting
companies and the SEC, the default perspective is that of investors, as investors represent the
cohort to which SST disclosures are directed.
17. See supra text accompanying note 14.
18. A point of clarification: “state sponsor of terrorism” is not the sole terrorism
designation in use. The term “foreign terrorist organization” designates organizations
engaging in terrorist activities or retaining the capability and intent to engage in terrorist
activities, and other designations have also been employed throughout history. Bureau of
Counterterrorism, Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE,
https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designations-and-state-sponsors-of-terrorism/
[https://perma.cc/ZXU6-S7F5] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). The scope of this Note is
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the SEC does not make these determinations; the authority to formally
designate a country as an SST resides with the U.S. secretary of state.19 Part
I.A.1 below discusses more thoroughly the criteria for designating a country
as a sponsor of terrorism. Part I.A.2 then discusses the four countries
currently designated as SSTs and the rationale for their respective
designations.
1. The Legal Framework of SST Designation
The U.S. secretary of state designates a country as an SST if that country
repeatedly provides support for international acts of terrorism.20 The
designation remains until it is rescinded by the U.S. Department of State.21
The secretary of state’s legal authority to make the SST determination derives
from three laws: the Export Administration Act of 1979,22 the Arms Export
Control Act,23 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.24
Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act grants the secretary of state
the authority to designate a country as an SST if that country has “repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism,” including by allowing
any part of the country’s territory to be used as a sanctuary for terrorists.25
Section 40 of the Arms Control Act similarly grants the secretary of state the
authority to determine that the government of a country has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism. 26 Lastly, like § 40 of the
Arms Control Act, § 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act recognizes the
secretary’s authority to determine that a country’s government has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism.27 Taken together, these
exclusively limited to SSTs. These differences are only raised to mitigate confusion by
distinguishing SSTs from other terrorist-related designations.
19. See infra Part I.A.2.
20. See Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 12. The underlying definitions of a
“terrorist act” and “terrorism” are complex; indeed, the search for a definition of terrorism has
been compared to the “quest for the Holy Grail.” See Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal
Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 249
(2004) (citing Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 119
(1996)). Still, the “vast majority” of proposed definitions incorporate the notion of “violence”
and “political purpose or motivation.” Id. at 251.
21. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM 2016, at 303 (2017) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 2016].
22. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); 50 U.S.C. § 4605(j).
23. Pub. L. No. 96-28, 82 Stat. 1320 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
22 U.S.C.); 22 U.S.C. § 2780.
24. Pub. L. No. 87-194, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.); 22 U.S.C. § 2371; see also Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 12 (discussing
the interplay of the three laws).
25. 50 U.S.C. § 4605(j). Interestingly, this act was repealed, but determinations made
under its provisions are continued by § 1768 of the Exports Controls Act of 2018. See DIANNE
E. RENNACK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43835, STATE SPONSORS OF ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM—LEGISLATIVE PARAMETERS: IN BRIEF 3 (2021).
26. 22 U.S.C. § 2780(d).
27. Id. § 2371(a).
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three acts functionally authorize the secretary of state to designate a foreign
government as an SST.28
2. Countries Currently Designated as SSTs
There are four countries currently designated as SSTs: Syria, Iran, North
Korea, and Cuba.29 Syria has been designated as an SST since 1979,
followed by Iran in 1984, North Korea in 2017, and most recently, Cuba in
early 2021.30 The secretary of state is statutorily required to provide a report
on terrorism to the speaker of the House of Representatives and the U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations each year, discussing the status of
terrorism in countries meeting certain criteria.31 Therefore, information
regarding countries’ SST designations is publicly available via annual
reports, and further, these reports include detailed information explaining
why a country is designated as an SST for that particular year.32 Recent
annual reports shed light on the State Department’s current evaluations of
SSTs.33
The Department of State designated Syria as an SST in 1979.34 This
designation remains today, because the regime of Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad continues to provide political and military support to terrorist
groups.35 Further, Syria serves as a “hub for foreign terrorist fighters,”
providing networks for extremism throughout the Middle East.36 The
country takes a “permissive attitude” toward terrorist groups such as
al-Qaeda and ISIS,37 and repeatedly violated its obligations under the
Chemical Weapons Convention.38
The Department of State designated Iran as an SST in 1984, and today,
Iran is considered the most prominent country in the SST arena.39 Iran
28. See generally RENNACK, supra note 25.
29. Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 12.
30. Id.
31. See 2 U.S.C. § 2656f(a). Since 2004, this report has been published as Country
Reports on Terrorism. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2005 (2006). Prior to 2004, the report was published under
the name Patterns of Global Terrorism. Id.
32. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 2656f(a). Statutory language further specifies which
activities should be raised and assessed in the report. Id.
33. See generally COUNTRY REPORTS 2016, supra note 21; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU
OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2017 (2018) [hereinafter
COUNTRY REPORTS 2017]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2018 (2019) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 2018]; U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2019 (2020)
[hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 2019].
34. See COUNTRY REPORTS 2016, supra note 21, at 305.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See COUNTRY REPORTS 2017, supra note 33, at 219–20.
38. See COUNTRY REPORTS 2016, supra note 21, at 306.
39. See id. at 304. The 2016 Report labeled Iran “the foremost state sponsor of terrorism,”
id. at 19, 304, while the 2017 and 2018 reports indicated that Iran remained the world’s
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provides support for Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza and terrorist groups
in Syria, Iraq, and the Middle East at large, and Iran has worked to create
instability in the Middle East while cultivating and supporting terrorist
groups abroad.40 Iran is further responsible for intensifying conflicts in
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon.41
North Korea was originally designated as an SST in 1988,42 but the United
States rescinded the designation in October 2008.43 The designation was
again reinstated in 2017 because North Korea supported acts of international
terrorism and violated United Nations Security Council resolutions.44 The
2018 Country Report on Terrorism also cited North Korea’s involvement in
assassinations on foreign soil for its renewed designation as an SST.45
Most recently, the Department of State designated Cuba as an SST on
January 12, 2021.46 Cuba had been removed from the list in 2015, but it was
reinstated due to the Castro regime’s support of international terrorism in
providing a safe harbor to terrorists.47 Additionally, the State Department
determined that the Cuban government aids “murderers, bombmakers, and
hijackers” and harbors—and refuses to return—wanted fugitives to the
United States.48
Syria, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba are the four countries currently
designated as SSTs,49 and corporations doing business in or with these
countries are therefore subject to disclosure requirements.
“leading state sponsor of terrorism,” COUNTRY REPORTS 2017, supra note 33, at 8; COUNTRY
REPORTS 2018, supra note 33, at 9.
40. COUNTRY REPORTS 2016, supra note 21, at 304.
41. COUNTRY REPORTS 2017, supra note 33, at 218.
42. Id. at 217.
43. Id.
44. See COUNTRY REPORTS 2018, supra note 33, at 211.
45. See id.
46. Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 12.
47. Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Announces Designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of
Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 11, 2021), https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-announcesdesignation-of-cuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/index.html
[https://perma.cc/T58DX87P].
48. Id.
49. Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 12. Because the State Department reevaluates
annually which countries are designated as SSTs, there are several countries formerly
designated that have had their designations rescinded. The State Department removed the
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen from the list in 1990, although the country was
designated an SST since the list’s origination in 1979. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
COUNTERTERRORISM, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1990, at 32 (1991). Libya, also on
the original list, was removed in 2004. Elise Labott, U.S. to Restore Relations with Libya,
CNN (May 15, 2006, 8:30 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/15/libya/index.html
[https://perma.cc/35EU-SDLP]. The State Department removed Cuba, an SST since 1982, in
2015. See COUNTRY REPORTS 2019, supra note 33, at 183–84. Iraq, on the list intermittently
since 1979, was removed in 2004. See Donna Miles, U.S. Removes Iraq from List of State
Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Oct. 22, 2004), https://archive.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25006 [https://perma.cc/SV5F-PJXZ]. The Department of State
most recently rescinded Sudan’s designation as an SST on December 14, 2020, reflecting the
country’s years of efforts countering terrorist groups and preventing terrorist expansion. See
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B. Regulating Interactions with SSTs Through Disclosure
As evidenced above in the designation explanations,50 SSTs represent a
global threat. As such, federal securities laws provide multiple mechanisms
for regulating interactions with these countries. Companies that are subject
to the SEC’s disclosure requirements, known as “reporting companies,”51 are
those that: (1) sell securities on U.S. exchanges, (2) engage in interstate
commerce with 500 or more shareholders and $10,000,000 or more in assets,
or (3) have engaged in registered public offerings.52 Companies falling into
these categories are required to periodically file disclosures.53
Disclosure of SST-related activities is regulated through multiple methods.
This Note examines four principal mechanisms in this disclosure-based
regime, working from the least onerous to most onerous standard, in the sense
of how exacting each standard is to the companies it obligates.54 The
discussion begins in Part I.B.1 with a review of the traditional materiality
standard to the extent that the materiality standard requires SST disclosure.
Part I.B.2 then considers the slightly more specific disclosure requirements
under Regulation S-K. Part I.B.3 discusses the heightened, specific
disclosure requirements that the SEC solicits via comment letters. Finally,
Part I.B.4 discusses disclosure requirements pertaining to Iranian-related
activities, which are specifically mandated by legislation and require the
most extensive degree of disclosure.

Michael R. Pompeo, Sudan’s State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation Rescinded, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/sudans-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-designation-rescinded/
[https://perma.cc/VA3C-M8D3] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021); see also COUNTRY REPORTS
2016, supra note 21, at 305. Sudan had been included on the list since 1993 for its part in
harboring Osama bin Laden and for its support of militant Palestinian organizations. See Max
Bearak & Naba Mohieddin, U.S. Lifts Sudan’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism,
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2020, 9:15 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/sudanremove-state-terror-list/2020/12/14/7f119482-3d10-11eb-aad9-8959227280c4_story.html
[https://perma.cc/UU4U-6F5Y].
50. See supra Part I.A.2.
51. See Amy Deen Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?: U.S. Investors Are
Unknowingly Financing State Sponsors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1151, 1182 (2010)
[hereinafter Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?].
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012); see also Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra
note 51, at 1182.
53. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1182.
54. Importantly, this Note only examines SST regulation through a disclosure lens,
although federal securities regulation is certainly not the only way in which SSTs face
regulation. When the secretary of state determines that a country has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism, disclosure requirements are triggered; however, the
U.S. government may also impose sanctions on that country. See Bureau of Counterterrorism,
supra note 12. While sanctions are a mechanism of regulation worth mentioning due to their
importance in discussions of SST regulation, they will not be addressed further in the Note.
The remainder of this Note focuses solely on disclosure related to SSTs under the four
principal mechanisms raised in Part I.B.
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1. The Mandates of the Materiality Standard
In U.S. securities laws, whether companies must disclose certain business
activities depends on whether those business activities are considered
“material.”55 Two prominent U.S. Supreme Court cases guide the materiality
standard.56 In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,57 the Court held that
information is material if there is a “substantial likelihood that the
disclosure . . . would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”58
Similarly, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,59 the Court held that the materiality of
information depends on a balancing of the probability of the event’s
occurrence and the magnitude of the event, given the totality of activities.60
The SEC interprets these holdings collectively, explaining that “the Supreme
Court has determined information to be material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the information
important in making an investment decision or if the information would
significantly alter the total mix of available information.”61
The materiality standard in the context of SST disclosure is “the same
materiality standard applicable to all other corporate activities.”62 Disclosure
requirements under the materiality standard depend on what information is
meaningful to a reasonable investor.63 Considering this framework in the
context of SSTs, “[i]f combating terrorism is a priority . . . , then it may be
material to potential U.S. investors that the money they pay for shares in a
company may be used to fund operations in a country that sponsors
terrorism.”64 In determining which interactions should be disclosed in the
SST setting, companies generally consider the materiality of their contacts
with countries identified as SSTs.65 Particularly when a company’s business
activities with SSTs constitute a substantial financial portion of its business,
disclosure is likely required.66

55. Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1153.
56. See id. at 1186.
57. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
58. Id. at 449.
59. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
60. Id. at 238.
61. Concept Release on Mechanism to Access Disclosures Relating to Business Activities
in or with Countries Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,862, 65,863
(Nov. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Concept Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures]; see also
Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, SEC Disclosure of Business Related to State
Sponsors of Terrorism (Dec. 7, 2007), https://www.sullcrom.com/publication_detail_1180
[https://perma.cc/97RF-CXQT].
62. Concept Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures, supra note 61, at 65,863.
63. See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
64. Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1188.
65. See Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 12.
66. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1153.
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SST disclosure requirements mandated by the materiality standard are
therefore fairly general67 because federal securities laws do not impose any
specific requirements to disclose business activities in or with SSTs.68 On
its face, this standard is not particularly exacting, as it gives companies
discretion to make general materiality determinations regarding business in
or with SSTs and to disclose such information in the periodic reports they
file with the SEC.69 For this reason, this Note presents this standard as the
least onerous of the SST disclosure mechanisms. Determinations of
materiality are more challenging when a company’s operations relating to
SSTs are “economically slight” compared to the size of the company, as the
meaningfulness of a business activity is ultimately about more than just
money.70 For example, “[i]t is likely that a U.S. investor would want to know
if the company in which his retirement savings are invested is helping Iran’s
nuclear program or electoral repression.”71 Although investors might care
about money, they might also have concerns regarding threats to national
security, making a given disclosure that is financially slight still material.72
Overall, the materiality standard is not particularly onerous because it
grants deference to corporations to determine what must be disclosed. The
slightly more exacting standards under Regulation S-K and other catchall
provisions solicit SST disclosures with a higher degree of specificity.
2. Requirements of Regulation S-K
The SEC resolved some of the murkiness of the materiality standard by
implementing more specific disclosure requirements elsewhere, expressly
delineating items that companies must disclose. Between the various
67. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman Christopher Cox Concerning Companies’ Activities in Countries
Known to Sponsor Terrorism (July 20, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007138.htm [https://perma.cc/EL3F-E39M].
68. Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 61; see also Concept
Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures, supra note 61, at 65,863.
69. Generally, investors access disclosures in periodic reports companies file through
EDGAR (the “Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval” database), the system used
by companies submitting documents in connection with SEC disclosure requirements. About
EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/about [https://perma.cc/
2VG6-V3RH] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). However, in the past, the SEC has piloted other
methods of delivering material SST disclosures to investors—namely, the SEC web tool. See
Press Release, supra note 67. The tool, which was only in place from June 25, 2007, to July
20, 2007, permitted investors to obtain a list of companies doing business in or with SSTs. See
Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Rethinks Lists Linking Companies and Terrorist States, N.Y. TIMES
(July 21, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/21/business/21sec.html [https://perma.cc/
Q2BB-UFDK]; see also Banks, Lawmakers Oppose SEC’s Disclosure Tool Linking Public
Companies to Terrorist Nations, MONEY MANAGER’S COMPLIANCE GUIDE NEWSL., Sept.
2007, at 8. Companies mentioning an SST in their recent annual reports were incorporated
into the results of the web tool. See Press Release, supra note 67. The tool represents one way
in which the SEC has handled materiality disclosures previously.
70. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1180.
71. Id. at 1219.
72. See id. at 1219–20.
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provisions of Regulation S-K and Rule 12b-20 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act Rule 12b-20”), SEC-regulated companies are
governed by additional disclosure requirements that mandate more
information than the materiality requirement discussed above.
Regulation S-K provides more specific disclosure mandates via line-item
requirements.73 Under Regulation S-K, the SEC requires disclosure of
information about a company’s business, securities, financial data,
management, and other information, whether or not the information is
thought to be important to investors.74 Further, Regulation S-K requires
companies to disclose specified categories of information in the nonfinancial
portions of their periodic reports.75
Item 101 requires disclosure regarding the general development of the
business, a narrative description of the business, and other categories,
including information pertaining to securities, financial data, and
management.76 Item 101 specifically instructs companies to disclose
information about where a company does business, the principal markets for
the company’s products, the source of the raw products, and any risks
attendant to the business’s foreign operations.77 Any one of these categories
might implicate SST information, for instance, if raw products derive from
an SST or if business with an SST constitutes a risk factor.78 Item 103
requires disclosure of any material impending legal proceedings, including
proceedings known to be contemplated by government authorities.79 Item
303 also requires a discussion from management’s perspective of known
trends or events that might materially affect the company’s liquidity or
resources.80 SST disclosure is required here if business with SSTs affects a
company’s legal stability or its liquidity and resources. Item 503(c)
“center[s] around behavior that is inherently risky,” which in turn might
require disclosure of operations in SSTs if a company’s interactions with
SSTs create risk for the company.81
Other catchall regulations compel disclosure of activities related to SSTs,
as well. Exchange Act Rule 12b-20 requires that companies make statements

73. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality
Excuse Incomplete Disclosure Under the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13, 21 (2011)
[hereinafter Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran].
74. Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1183.
75. See Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 22.
76. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a), (c) (2021); see also Westbrook, What’s in Your
Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1184–85; Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 21.
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1); see also Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73,
at 21–22.
78. See Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 21–22.
79. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103; see also Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 22.
80. See Exchange Act Release No. 6211, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,717 (Apr. 26, 1987);
see also Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 22.
81. Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 22–23.
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that disclose any material information without being misleading.82 This
sweeping standard parallels the inclusive nature of the materiality standard
as applied to SST activity at large—as the SEC has expressed, stating that
“[a]ny such material information not covered by a specific rule or regulation
must be disclosed if necessary to make the required statements, in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.”83
The requirements of Regulation S-K and Exchange Act Rule 12b-20, like
the materiality standard discussed above, do not mandate disclosure
specifically for activities in or with SSTs. The provisions described here
introduce a slightly more onerous task for reporting companies, requiring
disclosure of specifically delineated categories with a higher degree of
specificity. In the larger scheme of mechanisms designed to induce SST
disclosures, however, these standards are still fairly nonexacting and afford
companies discretion in interpreting their applicability.
3. Disclosure by Means of Comment Letter84
In addition to SST disclosures required under the materiality standard and
those specifically solicited under other provisions, SST disclosures are
compelled by a third mechanism: comment letters.85 As a general practice,
in line with the SEC’s core mission, the Division of Corporation Finance
(DCF) regularly reviews filings for disclosures that appear to be deficient or
to conflict with SEC regulations.86 The DCF then issues comment letters,
leading to correspondence between the SEC and companies.87 These
comment letters serve multiple purposes, as the DCF uses them to request
clarification, to ask for revisions or updates to financial reports, and more
generally, to deter fraud and increase investors’ ability to access certain
information.88 Moreover, this form of oversight is a common practice for the
SEC in gaining information regarding SST-related activities: as of 2018, 12
82. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b–20; see also Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra
note 51, at 1185.
83. Concept Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures, supra note 61, at 863.
84. As a technical matter, although some scholars writing on the topic regularly refer to
these comment letter responses as “SST disclosures,” one source noted that these
correspondences do not really constitute disclosure. See Westbrook, What’s in Your
Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1215–16. This is because the SEC does not uniformly issue
comment letters, and responses lack consistency and vary in length and detail, rendering
comparison difficult. Id. Nevertheless, there is a standard format to these inquires: letters
identify a periodic disclosure in question, ask a substantive question, and ask a company to
evaluate the materiality of its operations with an SST. Id. at 1212. Thus, for the purposes of
this Note, because these sources regularly “disclose” information regarding interactions with
SSTs and have some consistent elements with one another, these communications will be
considered alongside other disclosure-generating mechanisms.
85. See Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6.
86. See Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 6.
87. Id. at 6–7.
88. Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6.
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percent of comment letters issued by the SEC pertained to SST disclosures.89
However, the origin of the comment letter process as it relates to SST
disclosure is slightly more complex.
The SEC’s Office of Global Security Risk (OGSR) was created as a
subdivision of the DCF, at the direction of Congress in 2003, to monitor
whether companies’ filings include disclosure of material information
regarding global security risk-related issues.90 The House Committee report
that instructed the SEC to establish the OGSR expressed the concern that
American investors “may be unwittingly investing in companies with ties to
countries that sponsor terrorism and countries linked to human rights
violations.”91 The report further posited that “a company’s association with
sponsors of terrorism and human rights abuses, no matter how large or small,
can have a material adverse effect on a public company’s operations,
financial condition, earnings, and stock prices, all of which can negatively
affect the value of an investment.”92
With an understanding that existing disclosure mechanisms failed to
capture some of this information, the legislature established the OGSR to
review reports filed by reporting companies to determine whether such
companies must disclose additional information about global security risk
issues.93 Because the SEC does not mandate specific line-item requirements
on companies’ interactions with SSTs, the OGSR’s duties specifically
include both identifying companies that operate in designated SSTs and
ensuring that such companies disclose that information to investors.94 The
OGSR is critical in the realm of soliciting SST disclosures.95 After
identifying relevant instances of SST interaction, the OGSR further
contributes to the comment letter process, providing support to the DCF in
enhancing reporting compliance via SST disclosures.96
The DCF comment letters arise in two different fashions.97 In some
instances, the SEC addresses a firm’s preexisting disclosures from within
their prior financial reports, responding with follow-up questions regarding
SST-related information.98 This is the most common method by which
89. Id.
90. See Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 8.
91. H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003).
92. Id.
93. See David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using
the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 350 (2011).
94. See id. at 350–51.
95. See generally Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, New Law Requires
Issuers to Disclose Certain Iran-Related Transactions (Sept. 5, 2012),
https://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/files/Publication/5582a18f-bbb4-4a9d-8460081d04b67cc5/Preview/PublicationAttachment/0bfb3e4b-6b59-42f5-86ad10493c25f561/090512_Iran_Related.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3MV-Z7X6].
96. Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 8.
97. See Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6.
98. Id. For example, in 2012, the SEC issued a comment letter to Logitech International:
“We also note the disclosure on page 5 and elsewhere in your form 10-K that you operate in
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comment letters are generated, given that existing disclosures are referenced
in 80.5 percent of SST comment letters.99 In other situations, the DCF issues
comment letters independently from financial report disclosures, responding
instead to information from other sources.100 In these instances, comment
letters reference an external outlet of information spurring the inquiry; for
example, 26.8 percent of SST comment letters referenced a report from the
media.101 Although the DCF letters were historically nonpublic, the SEC
began posting inquiries and responses on the Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval System (EDGAR) after pushback from both
investors and Congress demanding greater transparency.102 Now, a great
deal (but not all) of correspondence is publicly available.103
These filings reveal that disclosure by means of comment letter creates a
heightened standard of disclosure related to SSTs in the sense that the SEC
requests more particularized information from companies as compared to the
materiality standard that grants companies deference in determining what
information matters for disclosure. While comment letters as a mechanism
are not necessarily more onerous (in that their requests might be simple or
straightforward), comment letters require disclosure of information to a
higher degree of specificity—information not initially released in accordance
with the materiality standard.
4. The ITRA and Iran-Related Disclosure Mandates
Unlike the broad discretionary securities disclosure laws, disclosure of
Iran-related activities is specifically mandated. On August 10, 2012,
President Barack Obama signed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA).104 The ITRA augmented preexisting Iran-related
regions including the Middle East and Africa. As you know, Iran, Syria, and Sudan, countries
located in those regions, are designated by the U.S. Department of State as state sponsors of
terrorism . . . . Your Form 10-K does not include disclosure about contacts with those
countries.” Id. (quoting Comment Letter from Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
to Celia Blye & Jennifer Hardy, Logitech International S.A. (May 30, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1032975/000119312513018890/filename1.htm
[https://perma.cc/2F7D-8MY5]).
99. Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 11.
100. Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6; see, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 2–3 (discussing
the press coverage of Barbies in Iran).
101. Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 12.
102. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1215; infra
Parts II.A.1–2 (discussing arguments in favor of SST disclosure due to the need for
transparency and investor demand).
103. Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1215.
104. See Pub. L. No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.); see also Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Exchange Act Requires
Issuers to Disclose Iran-Related Activities: Disclosures Required in Reports Due to Be Filed
on or After February 6, 2013 (Dec. 5, 2012), https://www.sullcrom.com/BExchange-ActRequires-Issuers-to-Disclose-Iran-Related-Activities-BDisclosures-Required-in-ReportsDue-to-Be-Filed-On-or-After-February-6-2013-12-16-2012 [https://perma.cc/U5YY-8TUU].
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regulations, such as the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996105 and the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.106 Further, the
ITRA created new sanctions specifically for human rights abuses in Iran and
Syria.107
Most importantly for the scope of this Note, § 219(b) of the ITRA imposed
new reporting requirements on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,108
amending § 13 of the Act by requiring reporting companies to disclose any
information relating to their assistance in transferring goods or technologies
or providing services that are likely to be used by the Iranian government to
commit human rights abuses.109 The ITRA further mandated that public
companies include explanatory disclosures in their periodic reports if they
engaged in other specific transactions or activities with Iran.110
The disclosure requirements under the ITRA are significantly more
onerous than other SST disclosure requirements. Reporting companies that
have “knowingly engaged” in such activities must include pertinent
disclosures in their quarterly or annual filings.111 Section 219 further
requires that companies concurrently make an “IRANNOTICE filing” with
the SEC.112 Importantly, and in contrast to the materiality standard described
above, there is no de minimis exception to the disclosure requirements under
§ 219.113 In other words, there is no materiality threshold for triggering
mandatory reporting under § 219 of the ITRA.114 In addition, the ITRA
requires that the SEC deliver a report with responsive disclosures to the
president.115 Because the disclosure requirements are imposed by the ITRA,
the SEC maintains no discretion to decline solicitation of Iran-related
disclosure requirements,116 and the president must investigate the activities
disclosed in the filings and determine whether to impose sanctions on
companies for engaging in violative activities.117
105. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note.
106. Pub. L. No. 11-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 104.
107. Id. But see supra note 54 (limiting the scope of this Note to disclosure rather than
considering the implications of sanctions).
108. See Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations: Exchange Act Sections, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/
exchangeactsections-interps.htm [https://perma.cc/8UYV-SXA5].
109. See Park, supra note 8, at 108; see also Noam Noked, SEC Requirements Under the
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Sept. 10, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/09/10/sec-requirements-under-theiran-threat-reduction-and-syria-human-rights-act/ [https://perma.cc/3V7P-6DRX].
110. See Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 104.
111. See Park, supra note 8, at 108–09.
112. See id. at 122–23; Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 12.
113. See Park, supra note 8, at 109.
114. See id. at 111.
115. See Memorandum Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 12; see also
Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 104.
116. See Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 95.
117. See Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 12; Memorandum
from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 104.
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Overall, the ITRA is arguably the most thorough and onerous of all the
disclosure mechanisms. It expanded existing regulation to solicit mandatory
disclosure from companies that had not been specifically mandated, requiring
companies to disclose almost all interactions with Iran.118 The ITRA
requirements distinguish themselves from the requirements of the materiality
standard and Regulation S-K because the ITRA creates specific disclosure
requirements, pertaining to business with SSTs, not seen in the
aforementioned mechanisms.119 The ITRA disclosure requirements also
differ from the comment letter approach, as the ITRA takes a more
comprehensive, prescriptive approach, as compared to the more reactive
comment letter approach.120 While the comment letters issued by the SEC
function more responsively, either as a reaction to company’s filings or
information found on a company’s website or in media reports, the disclosure
requirements of the ITRA are imposed by the Act itself and do not require
the SEC to take affirmative action to obtain information.121
Considering the ITRA alongside the framework of the other disclosure
mechanisms, the SEC requires companies to make a variety of SST-related
disclosures. Companies must disclose: information about their interactions
with SSTs if those interactions are material,122 information falling under
specific items in Regulation S-K,123 information (material or not) requested
by the SEC in comment letters,124 and information about all interactions with
Iran.125
II. THE DISCLOSURE DEBATE: THE ABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF
EXISTING SST DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
Part I.B articulated the SEC’s four principal disclosure mechanisms for
soliciting information pertaining to SSTs: (1) the materiality standard, (2)
the provisions of Regulation S-K, (3) inquiry by comment letter, and (4) the
requirements of the ITRA. Part II of this Note analyzes these practices and
considers whether the SEC’s current framework regarding SST disclosure
functions altogether as a worthwhile, effective system for regulating
interactions with countries designated as SSTs.
Part II.A considers the benefits that SST disclosures provide. Part II.B.
turns to the critiques of the current system. Lastly, Part II.C considers a
perspective that falls between these two poles—the idea that SST disclosure
is inherently a beneficial practice but that issues with the present mechanisms
used to solicit such disclosures hamper the benefits.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 95.
See supra Parts I.B.1–2.
See supra Part I.B.3.
See Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 95.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part I.B.3.
See supra Part I.B.4.
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A. Benefits of SST Disclosure
Many individuals and entities favor SST disclosure requirements.
Statements from the SEC, the legislature, politicians, and particularly
investors, reflect this attitude. This section navigates the primary arguments
in favor of SST disclosure. Part II.A.1 considers disclosure as a means of
ensuring transparency, Part II.A.2 examines how such disclosure fulfills
investor demand, and Part II.A.3 explores how SST disclosure is used to
achieve more socially beneficial practices.
1. Creating Transparency Through Information
The first and perhaps most obvious benefit of SST disclosure requirements
is that these requirements produce more information, leading to transparency
regarding SSTs. The SEC articulated why mandating SST disclosure is
desirable from an information-forcing perspective.126 Speaking specifically
of SSTs, former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox stated: “Our role is to make
that information readily accessible to the investing public, and we will
continue to work to find better ways to accomplish that objective.”127 SST
disclosures are therefore praised for their ability to make information more
readily available.
Further, this argument arises within the context of U.S. securities laws,
which, like all disclosure-based regimes, view transparency as a desirable
aim.128 Disclosure-based regimes “operate[] on the assumption that better
information . . . will help buyers and sellers of securities make better
judgments” and, in doing so, lead to more accurate prices.129 Requiring SST
disclosure aids this process.
Thus, transparency, though a desirable goal in and of itself, is also a means
to more desirable ends. Indeed, one of the fundamental “organizing
principles” of securities laws in the United States holds that mandatory
disclosure of information enables more efficient capital markets, which
benefits all investors.130 Accurate, transparent disclosure methods enable
increased stock price accuracy.131 Disclosure requirements overall (and SST

126. See Press Release, supra note 67.
127. Id. Voices advocating for the investing public have similarly called on the SEC to
create transparency around SSTs. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Thomas P. DiNapoli, N.Y.
State Comptroller, to Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Jan. 22,
2008), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-23.pdf [https://perma.cc/JNV5ZV4W] (“I strongly support the SEC’s efforts to increase transparency and access to
information about companies’ activities in countries designated by the United States
Department of State as Sponsors of Terrorism . . . .”).
128. See generally Press Release, supra note 67.
129. Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 72.
130. See Ferrell, supra note 7, at 213–14.
131. See id. at 216.
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disclosure practices under this greater umbrella) can be economically
beneficial in facilitating more efficient capital markets.132
The desirability of transparency surrounding SSTs has also been echoed in
the political sphere. Former Senator Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut
called on the SEC to facilitate shareholders’ “access [to] reliable information
regarding publicly traded companies’ business transactions involving Iran
and Sudan.”133 The House Committee report that instructed the SEC to
establish the OGSR similarly argued for the importance of transparency in
SST disclosures because “a company’s association with [SSTs] . . . no matter
how large or small, can have a material adverse effect on a public company’s
operations, financial condition, earnings, and stock prices.”134 These
consequences risk negatively impacting the value of an investment, and thus,
transparency in providing such information is fundamentally important.135
Investors, government officials, and guidance provided in the legal field have
all expressed the importance of publicly disclosing information pertaining to
business in or with SSTs.136 Thus, the notion that SST disclosure is
beneficial and should be encouraged as a means of disseminating information
to investors pervades various sectors.
Further, transparency that serves to enhance the efficiency of the market
leads to more beneficial results, as well.137 One perspective in favor of
disclosure requirements argues that these requirements lead to improvements
in the allocation of capital, as well as reduced costs arising from disparate
interests of shareholders and stakeholders.138 Evidently, transparency is
desirable not only as an inherently honest objective but also insofar as it
serves as a means to achieving more efficient markets and more economically
beneficial practices. SST disclosure mechanisms are therefore desirable
because of their ability to increase transparency in pursuit of these greater
goals.
2. Fulfilling Existing Investor Demand
As a general principle, investors expect to know what companies do and
how their capital is being used.139 For investors to be adequately informed
of companies’ interactions with SSTs, proponents of regulation argue that the
SEC must mandate SST disclosure.
132. See Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation
Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81, 115–16 (2007).
133. Norris, supra note 69.
134. H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003).
135. Id. (“[A] company’s association with sponsors of terrorism . . . can have a material
adverse effect on a public company’s operations, financial condition, earnings, and stock
prices . . . .”); see also Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1196.
136. See Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 61; see also
Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1153–54.
137. See Ferrell, supra note 7, at 216.
138. See id.
139. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1217.
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The Center for Capital Market Competitiveness, a program of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, underscored this point in a comment letter to the
SEC, recognizing first that “investors have an important interest in ensuring
their funds do not support terrorism” and further that investors demand fair
and equal access to information.140 Under this argument, the SEC should
require SST disclosure to ensure that investor interests are adequately
addressed. The New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli similarly
echoed, “It is vital for investors . . . to have access to accurate, timely and
complete information on companies’ connections to [SSTs] in order to assess
the risks posed fully.”141 These sources express the widely held desire from
the investing public to have access to information regarding SSTs.142
Further, the SEC has even noted the exceptional degree of demonstrated
public interest in accessing this information.143
Therefore, beyond ensuring that information regarding SSTs is
transparent, proponents of SST disclosure contend that the disclosure is
desirable because it functions to fulfill investor demand. Ample evidence
suggests that SST disclosures are indeed important to investors and that, in
requiring these disclosures, the SEC fulfills investor demand.
3. Encouraging Socially Beneficial Practices
Although the SEC traditionally regulates in the sphere of financial matters,
SEC-promulgated mandates occasionally extend into other spheres.144 One
such example of this is with SST disclosures. Proponents of disclosure
requirements that reach beyond financial information argue that broadening
the scope of disclosure is desirable, as heightened requirements encourage

140. Comment Letter from Michael J. Ryan, Jr., Exec. Dir. and Senior Vice President, U.S.
Chamber Ctr. for Cap. Mkts. Competitiveness, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 1, 3 (Feb. 4, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-28.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3H9-H36V].
141. Comment Letter from Thomas P. DiNapoli to Christopher Cox, supra note 127, at 1;
see also Comment Letter from Robert “Kinney” Poynter, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of State
Auditors, Controllers and State Treasurers, et al., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n 1 (Jan. 22, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-22.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XA4-EUQU] (explaining that because investors have an interest in
ensuring they are not acting contrary to foreign policy and humanitarian goals, investors seek
“the assistance of the SEC . . . in identifying those corporations that, by virtue of their business
or business ties in terrorist sponsoring countries, are acting contrary to U.S. foreign policy and
humanitarian interests”).
142. See supra notes 139–41.
143. See Press Release, supra note 67. Perhaps the most prominent evidence of investor
demand for SST information occurred with the release of the SEC web tool. See generally
supra note 69. The SEC released a statement detailing this demand: “Since the SEC added
to our Internet site a web tool that permits investors to obtain information directly from
company disclosure documents about their business interests in countries [designated as
SSTs], the site has experienced exceptional traffic.” Press Release, supra note 67. In the three
weeks the web tool was live, visitors to the site “hit” the material well over 150,000 times. Id.
144. See Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6; see also infra Part II.B.1.
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socially beneficial behavior.145 This is largely because disclosure invites
increased public scrutiny that pressures companies to improve their
underlying practices.146 SST disclosure is part of “a more general push to
expand disclosure regulation to encourage social change,”147 furthering the
efforts of national security policy through global business regulation.148
Moreover, proponents of SST disclosure requirements argue that
disclosure for social benefit is not a newfangled concept. Although SEC
disclosure requirements are based in materiality and the SEC is primarily
concerned with financial oversight, public concern regarding noneconomic
effects of business means that the SEC occasionally uses mandatory
disclosure to advance social goals.149 Proponents of social disclosure
requirements argue that the requirements advance noneconomic policy
issues, ranging from the environment to human rights issues, by increasing
overall transparency.150 The SEC has also historically used disclosure
mechanisms to address a wide range of policy issues, such as climate change
risks and sustainability concerns.151 As another example, the “Specialized
Corporate Disclosure” provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act152 require disclosure relating to mine safety and
conflict minerals.153 SST disclosures are, if anything, less novel than other
disclosure requirements for social good: SST disclosures remain largely
145. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L.
823, 854 (2005). Some commentators even argue that the principal purpose of disclosure is
not to achieve efficient capital markets, as discussed in Part II.A.1, but rather to reach better
practices. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Stealth Compensation via Retirement
Benefits, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 291, 320 (2004) (“The main aim of requiring disclosure of
executive compensation is not to enable accurate pricing of the firm’s securities. Rather, this
disclosure is primarily intended to provide some check on arrangements that are too favorable
to executives.”).
146. Cf. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 145, at 854 (arguing that disclosure pertaining to
executive compensation leads to enhanced transparency, exerting pressure on companies to
adopt more acceptable practices); Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 145, at 320 (explaining that
market forces, social dynamics, business press, and popular media exert pressure to adapt
socially beneficial practices when undesirable disclosures are made and that directors,
concerned about disapproval, comply).
147. Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6. But see Mary Jo White, Former Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Address at the 14th Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Corporate Securities and Financial
Law Lecture: The Importance of Independence, Fordham L. Sch. (Oct. 3, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100113mjw [https://perma.cc/442D-ZSZK] (“[A]s the
Chair of the SEC, I must question, as a policy matter, using the federal securities laws and the
SEC’s powers of mandatory disclosure to accomplish these goals.”). Part II.B.1 further
elaborates on arguments against the SEC furthering policy goals.
148. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1153.
149. See Park, supra note 8, at 89.
150. See id.; see also supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the benefits of transparency in a
disclosure-based regime).
151. See Lynn, supra note 93, at 349–50; see also Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?,
supra note 51, at 1188.
152. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
153. See Lynn, supra note 93, at 327–28.
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rooted in notions of materiality and thus align with traditional regulation by
the SEC.154
Therefore, though the core mission of the SEC focuses on financial
disclosure, the SEC occasionally modifies its approach, requiring broadened
disclosures relating to conduct that is not strictly financial.155 Supporters of
SST disclosure requirements argue that these requirements regulate SSTs in
a similar manner, improving the practices of corporations, as the inherent
pressure of outside scrutiny compels corporations to align their activities with
more socially beneficial practices.156
B. The Perspectives Against SST Disclosure Requirements
Despite the existence of SST disclosure requirements for several decades,
critics still contend that they are ineffective and should not exist in their
current form. Part II.B.1 discusses the argument that the SEC is not the
proper entity for the regulation of SSTs. Part II.B.2 then examines the
shortcomings of the materiality standard. Part II.B.3 turns to the problematic
stigmatization resulting from SST disclosure mechanisms.
1. The SEC as the Wrong Regulator
The most sweeping argument against current SST disclosure requirements
suggests that existing disclosure mechanisms are inappropriate because the
SEC should not involve itself with such regulation.157 There are two strains
of this argument. The first finds that the SEC as an agency is an inappropriate
regulator in this sphere.158 The second argument takes an externally focused
approach: rather than positioning the SEC as inherently wrong for the role,
this argument suggests other entities are better suited for the task.159
To begin, some critics argue against SEC-promulgated SST disclosure on
the premise that the sphere of terrorism does not properly fall under the
SEC’s domain.160 The SEC’s mission concerns itself with the regulation of
financial reports, the deterrence of fraud, and the facilitation of investor

154. See id. at 350. But see supra Part I.B.4 (discussing the absence of a de minimis
threshold mandating disclosure under the ITRA).
155. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J.
923, 936–37 (2019).
156. See supra note 146.
157. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Diana L. Preston, Managing Dir. and Assoc. Gen.
Counsel, and David G. Strongin, Managing Dir., Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Nancy M.
Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Jan. 22, 2008) [hereinafter SIFMA Letter],
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DER-9JWX]; see
also Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial Reporting
Oversight?, supra note 6.
158. See, e.g., SIFMA Letter, supra note 157; Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism
Disclosure Limit SEC Financial Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6.
159. See, e.g., SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2.
160. See generally, e.g., Lynn, supra note 93; SIFMA Letter, supra note 157.
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access to information; regulating SST disclosures is outside of its domain.161
Critics claim that in focusing on a political or foreign policy agenda, the SEC
acts inconsistently with its traditional role of overseeing the disclosure of
material information.162
The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)
expressed this viewpoint via a comment letter directed to the SEC.163
SIFMA argued that the SEC’s mission is neither foreign policy nor national
security matters and that, consequently, disclosure mandated by the SEC
pertaining to SSTs is “inherently unrelated to the SEC’s primary mission” of
administering and enforcing disclosure-based securities laws.164 A similar
letter from the law firm Shearman & Sterling LLP echoed this sentiment,
asserting that because the SEC is an independent government agency, it
should not use its resources to solicit disclosure pertaining to SSTs beyond
those compelled by the materiality standard, as any disclosure beyond
materiality does not further the SEC’s mission of providing investors
material information.165
Further, a recent empirical study supports the notion that the SEC, in
focusing its efforts on SST disclosure, compromises its ability to effectively
regulate elsewhere.166 This study suggests that this pattern occurs in part
because the SEC is subject to budget constraints, so shifting efforts toward
SST regulation strains the limited resources that might otherwise go toward
financial oversight.167 The study speculates that SST disclosure regulation
crowds out financial reporting and increases the risk that accounting errors
will be overlooked.168
A final criticism of the SEC as a regulatory body in the SST space focuses
more on institutional concerns. When the SEC begins regulating in spheres
with more ambiguous guidance, the argument follows that the SEC risks
damaging the integrity of the materiality standard.169 One critique of
161. See Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6.
162. See Lynn, supra note 93, at 350; cf. Mary Jo White, supra note 147 (disagreeing with
the policy that uses federal securities laws as a method for nonfinancial regulation).
163. See generally SIFMA Letter, supra note 157.
164. Id. at 1.
165. See Comment Letter from Abigail Arms, Cap. Mkts. Partner, Shearman & Sterling
LLP, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Feb. 15, 2008),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-29.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6JJ-LVXN].
166. See Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6; see also Comment Letter from Paul D. Glenn, Couns.,
Inv. Adviser Ass’n, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Jan. 22, 2008),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-25.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8HG9-66TS]
(arguing that “the SEC has limited resources that [are] diverted by [SST] initiative[s]”).
167. Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6.
168. Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 1–3. Interestingly,
because similar effects for comment letters referencing non-SST risk factors were not
observed, this issue is a unique result of SST regulation. Id. at 4.
169. See SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 3–4.
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SEC-regulated SST disclosure, therefore, argues for preserving the integrity
of “the time-honored materiality standard on which our disclosure-based
approach to securities registration has long been based.”170
Parallel to the argument that the SEC is intrinsically an inappropriate
regulator in this sphere is the notion that other entities are better suited for
the task. Critics of SST regulation argue that the SEC should defer to the
Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, and
Department of Homeland Security or to the Office of Foreign Assets Control
on matters of foreign policy.171 This argument is bolstered by the subject
matter of SST disclosures: the content necessarily deals with international
policy and terrorism. SIFMA expressed the viewpoint that foreign policy
and national security matters should be left to other government agencies that
might deal more appropriately in such subject matter because the SEC lacks
the requisite expertise in this area where other bodies specialize.172
Overall, general concerns persist regarding whether the SEC should be
concerned with influencing social policy, whether such concerns ultimately
take precedence over keeping investors informed, and whether such
extraneous focus runs the risk of actually causing harm to the SEC’s other
functionalities.173 Simply, critics argue that entities other than the SEC can
more aptly handle this challenge.
2. Disclosure as an Ineffective Mechanism of SST Regulation
Other criticisms of SST disclosure requirements, rather than denouncing
the SEC as the wrong regulator, address issues inherent to the underlying
mechanisms. The principal argument against the effectiveness of SST
disclosure is premised on the idea that the materiality standard, without
further guidance from the SEC on how to apply it, is unsuccessful in
soliciting disclosures from companies because of its lack of specificity.174
One study analyzed the publicly available disclosures of over one hundred
companies conducting business within SSTs.175 The study found that fewer
than half of the companies made any disclosures of their activities in relation
to the designated countries, and even those that did often withheld
information regarding the nature of the business.176
Some critics of current SST disclosure practices allege that the ambiguous
applicability of the materiality standard undermines the SEC’s attempts at
170. Id. at 2.
171. See id.; see also Mary Jo White, supra note 147 (arguing in favor of the SEC
maintaining its independence rather than bowing to outside forces). White stressed the
importance of the SEC standing strong against pressure to invoke its disclosure power to exert
influence over companies to change behavior rather than merely to disclose financial
information. Id.
172. See SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2.
173. Fisch, supra note 155, at 939; see also supra note 166.
174. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1218–19.
175. See id. at 1153–54.
176. Id. at 1154.
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regulation, as companies assert that they need not disclose their interactions
with SSTs if such activity is not a substantial part of their global
operations.177 Indeed, reporting companies have expressed the belief that
when their activities in or with SSTs are not “financially significant,” they
are under no obligation to disclose the activities.178 The argument follows
that disclosure of activities with SSTs is empirically inadequate, as
companies subvert the standard when possible.179 Critics of SST disclosures
contend that the underlying materiality standard is not taken seriously and,
consequently, that SST disclosure is ineffective.180
The materiality standard is not the only disclosure mechanism that faces
critique as contributing to an ineffective system, however. An additional
argument against current requirements condemns the usefulness of comment
letters in soliciting disclosures as having counterproductive effects.181 For
example, inquiries from the DCF, meant to produce greater transparency,
might encourage companies to provide less disclosure in the first place in an
attempt to dodge SEC detection for minor issues.182 The initiative risks
producing incomplete disclosure and inadvertently rewarding companies that
reveal less information, in contravention of the SEC’s goals.183
Critics thus fault the shortcomings of current SST disclosure mechanisms
and, in particular, condemn the functionality of the materiality standard and
comment letters because they implicate SST disclosures. These theories
ultimately support the argument that current SST disclosure practices are
problematic, ineffective, and work against the SEC’s goals.184
3. Unfair Stigmatization of Companies
The above discussion frames the materiality standard and comment letters
as creating an ineffective framework of SST disclosure mechanisms.
However, critics also assert that SST disclosures stigmatize companies that
make such disclosures.185 Reporting companies subjected to disclosure
requirements are inevitably connected to negative language—they are
177. See, e.g., id. at 1205; SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2–3 (detailing instances in
which corporations with stakes in companies with business activities in Sudan did not disclose
this information because it was not material to the company). But see Donald C. Langevoort,
Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud Liability in the Shadow of a Corporate
Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967, 1013 (2019) (“[T]he supposedly clean separation between
the financial and the non-financial is an illusion. Even if we stick closely to financial
materiality, there is ample research tying environmental, social, and similar aspects of
corporate behavior to stock market valuations and firm profitability.”).
178. Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1214.
179. See id. at 1153.
180. See, e.g., id. at 1218–19; see also SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2–3.
181. See Banks, Lawmakers Oppose SEC’s Disclosure Tool Linking Public Companies to
Terrorist Nations, supra note 69.
182. See SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2.
183. See id.
184. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1154.
185. See SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2.
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compelled to produce filings associating their business operations with
terrorism, although they themselves are neither perpetrating nor supporting
terrorism.186 These critiques do not simply assert that companies wish to
hide their distasteful conduct from investors; rather, this argument presents
the more nuanced notion that SST disclosures do not fairly reflect that the
underlying business activities of the companies are legal.187 The European
Commission, the executive branch of the European Union, observed this
phenomenon, noting that SEC disclosure practices fail to differentiate
companies’ interactions with SSTs that are legitimate and legal from those
that are more nefarious.188 Thus, some worry that when authorized activities
with SSTs are disclosed alongside unauthorized activities inconsistent with
U.S. laws and policies, this muddling of information confuses investors and
reduces the overall effectiveness of disclosures.189 Reporting companies,
whose unsavory—though not illegal—disclosures are made available to the
public, similarly argue against mandating such filings to protect their own
reputations.190 As a result, companies object to making SST disclosures
altogether because they fear alarming investors who wish to avoid investing
in companies doing business with SSTs.191
Critics argue, therefore, that mandating SST disclosure practices risks
unfairly stigmatizing companies that disclose their activities. These
arguments further reveal that reporting companies may resist disclosing their
business activities in or with SSTs unless they are obviously required to do
so, either because their activities with SSTs are significant or because a
particular piece of information is specifically solicited.192 The drawbacks to
disclosure yet again encourage companies to behave in ways that undermine
the very purpose of the disclosure requirements.
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2. This is why the short-lived web tool,
discussed in Part I.B.1, earned the nickname the “terrorism blacklist.” Banks, Lawmakers
Oppose SEC’s Disclosure Tool Linking Public Companies to Terrorist Nations, supra note
69. Although, as noted in Part I.B.1, disclosures revealing that companies do not do business
in particular SSTs were filtered out of the search, annual reports stating that a company had
pulled investments out of the SST warranted inclusion in the web tool’s list. See Press Release,
supra note 67.
188. See Comment Letter from David Wright, Deputy Gen. Dir., Eur. Comm’n, to Nancy
M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (May 6, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-27-07/s72707-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MWM-Z2YY]; see also Comment
Letter from Judith A. Lee & James D. Slear, Couns. for W. Union, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (Jan. 22, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-2707/s72707-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB7G-23FA] (“[T]he current practice regarding
disclosures of business activities in or with [SSTs] . . . makes no distinction between . . .
legitimate business activities that have been specifically licensed by the U.S. Government . . .
[and] activities that may be contrary to the interests of the United States or that contribute to
terrorism.”).
189. See Comment Letter from Judith A. Lee & James D. Slear to Nancy M. Morris, supra
note 188, at 4; supra notes 187–88.
190. See Press Release, supra note 67.
191. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1221.
192. Id. at 1153.
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C. A Critical Approach Favoring SST Disclosures
A third approach to analyzing SST disclosure mechanisms strikes a middle
ground, recognizing the pitfalls of the current framework while maintaining
that SST disclosures are beneficial and necessary. Part II.C.1 discusses the
benefits that could be achieved through SST disclosures, if only such
disclosures were enhanced. Part II.C.2 discusses the unavoidable costs of
SST disclosure that will exist no matter how thorough or sparse disclosure
requirements are. Ultimately, this critical perspective contends that,
generally, SST disclosure mechanisms are worthwhile but that the current
framework requires revision in order to be more effective.
1. (Potential) Benefits of SST Disclosure: What Might Be Possible Under
a Reformed Framework
This approach rests on the critique articulated in Part II.B.2: in the absence
of clear guidance from the SEC, the materiality standard is ineffective.193
Rather than argue against existing SST disclosure as a whole, however, this
critically optimistic perspective posits that information about a company’s
operation in or with SSTs is nevertheless important to investors.194 Instead
of disposing entirely of the current disclosure framework or arguing against
SST disclosures as inappropriate or unfair, this approach encourages
increased enforcement of SST disclosure by administering disclosure
requirements more strictly.195
The materiality standard is not the only problematic mechanism in
soliciting SST disclosures, however. To summarize Part I.B above, SST
disclosure requirements are triggered by the materiality standard, the
provisions of Regulation S-K, the cherry-picked inquiries of the DCF via
comment letters, and further, via a departure from the materiality standard
under the more exacting provisions of § 219 of the ITRA. The critical
perspective contends that although SST disclosures are desirable, this
multifaceted current framework creates a “lack of operational utility,”
undermining the effectiveness of disclosure efforts with vague, undefined
terms that ultimately hamper the value of disclosed information.196
One commentator proposed the adoption of a broad reading of the
materiality standard that would implicate SST disclosures more clearly to
clarify the inexactness of these standards.197 Legislative history supports this
argument, as the House Committee report that established the OGSR
similarly argued for transparency in SST disclosures under the premise that
any business in or with SSTs, “no matter how large or small,” can materially

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 1218–19; see also notes 174–84 and accompanying text.
See id. at 1218.
See id.
Park, supra note 8, at 93.
Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1189.
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affect a company’s operations and financial conditions and that, in turn, such
information is material to investors.198
This argument pushes for a shift in the materiality standard to
automatically trigger disclosure of SST activities, arguing for a presumption
of “materiality per se.”199 Indeed, the SEC even briefly considered adopting
a blanket assumption of materiality in the realm of SSTs.200 In 2001, the
SEC’s director of the Division of Corporation Finance stated, “We agree that
a reasonable investor would likely consider it significant that a foreign
company raising capital in the U.S. markets has business relationships with
countries, governments or entities with which any U.S. company would be
prohibited from dealing because of U.S. economic sanctions.”201 Later that
same year, the SEC departed from that position, assuring investors that the
SEC had no intention to require companies to make heightened disclosures
about business related to SSTs, but the argument has survived elsewhere.202
Proponents argue that without significantly amending current disclosure
mechanisms, the SEC could simply clarify that information pertaining to
business activities in or with SSTs is something reasonable investors care
about.203
A similar alternative to a materiality per se requirement would mandate
that companies disclose their SST activities through stricter enforcement of
the provisions of Regulation S-K.204 Further, this argument contends that
Regulation S-K could be amended to include an explicit SST disclosure
requirement, requiring that companies disclose their SST-related activities
pursuant to the provisions of Regulation S-K.205 One benefit to this proposal
is that it “would not be an onerous requirement—there are simply not that
many countries that the United States designates as SSTs.”206 These
possibilities together constitute a cautiously optimistic approach to SST
disclosure, maintaining that such information is important for investors but
offering various remedies to strengthen the effectiveness of the deficient
existing framework.

198. H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003); see also Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?,
supra note 51, at 1196.
199. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1188, 1193–94.
200. See Memorandum from David B.H. Martin, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., to Laura Unger,
Acting Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 8, 2001), in U.S.-CHINA SEC. REV.
COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S.-CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION: THE
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
CHINA A33, A35 (2002).
201. Id.
202. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1194.
203. See id. at 1220 (“No new law or regulation is necessary. All that is required is for the
SEC to enforce a reasonable, indeed traditional, understanding of ‘materiality.’”).
204. See Amy Deen Westbrook, The Inadequate Disclosure of Business Conducted in
Countries Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism, 39 SEC. REG. L.J. 15 (2011).
205. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1220.
206. Id.
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2. Costs of Disclosure: An Inherent Downside of Any SST Disclosure
Mechanism
The one commonality between all mechanisms used to solicit disclosures
from corporations is that subsequent disclosures can prove costly to the
companies. Any discussion of SST disclosure requirements is incomplete
without a consideration of costs. Because costs are virtually inevitable no
matter the degree of disclosure required, as explained below, this “downside”
is examined here, within the critical perspective of Part II.C, which ultimately
concludes that SST disclosure requirements are worthwhile even given their
drawbacks.
Most commonly, disclosure creates costs through fraud-on-the-market
litigation for the implied private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.207 When corporations address
known risk factors in their public filings, including environmental, social,
and human rights issues (or, as is pertinent here, interactions with SSTs),
their statements risk creating the basis for claims of actionable deception,
essentially opening companies to the possibility of litigation for their
statements.208 Thus, as far as corporations are concerned, SST disclosures
give rise to fraud liability for SST-related statements based on the accuracy
of the information contained in such statements. When corporations make
any statements, even soft or immaterial ones, they create a risk of fraud
claims for these statements that would not otherwise exist.209 These risks are
heightened in instances when corporations disclose in response to increased
investor interest—as is often the case with SST disclosures—or when the
corporations’ statements are repeated over time.210 Any type of elevated SST
disclosure requirement therefore risks liability for securities fraud claims,
where, without the initial disclosure, there would be no such liability.211
Disclosure thus necessarily implicates unintended costs for companies.212
Although disclosure may give rise to additional costs because of the
ensuing fraud liability, the alternate course of action—nondisclosure—does
not necessarily eliminate costs imposed on companies.213 This is the flipside
to the materiality requirements discussed above. Omissions liability—the
liability that arises from the failure to disclose material information—will
prove costly in many circumstances, so that nondisclosure in the sphere of

207. See Langevoort, supra note 177, at 970, 980–81 (“A fraud-on-the-market lawsuit
allows for recovery of damages on behalf of investors who bought or sold publicly traded
securities in an efficient marketplace at a price distorted by fraud on the part of the issuer or
its management.”).
208. See id. at 1014.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 980–81, 1014.
212. See id. at 1015.
213. See id.
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questionable materiality is not an adequate method of avoiding costs
either.214
In addition, the costs associated with disclosure lead to the assumption that
the threat of litigation causes less-than-optimal disclosure from companies,
“fearing the consequences if they make statements or projections that turn
out badly.”215 Corporations may be hesitant to make disclosures that might
inflate expectations or generate future litigation.216
Besides the costs associated with the risk of litigation created by disclosure
requirements, there are a slew of other associated costs.217 Real costs include
those associated with collecting information and weeding out that which is
immaterial.218 Further, in instances of disclosure that is speculative,
premature, or immaterial, such disclosure might lead to costly speculation
and overreaction by investors to the detriment of the company.219
Overall, the optimal level of disclosure is not always obvious—any level
of compromise in either direction is a trade-off between the benefits inherent
to disclosure and the costs associated with both the solicitation of disclosure
and the resulting risk of fraud liability. The discussion of disclosure costs
does not represent a clear-cut argument for or against SST disclosure
requirements. Instead, cost consideration functions as a necessary drawback
in considering securities disclosure requirements of any level.
While Part II.A considered the benefits of SST disclosure requirements
and Part II.B examined the drawbacks and criticisms, Part II.C here explores
214. See generally JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RSCH SERV., LSB10008, UPDATE: WHEN SILENCE
ISN’T GOLDEN: OMISSIONS LIABILITY UNDER SECURITIES LAW 2 (2017) (explaining that a
company’s failure to disclose will generally be considered “misleading” if the company has
an affirmative duty to disclose when a defendant has a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff,
where a statute or omission obliges a defendant to speak and, most applicably here, where an
omission renders an affirmative statement misleading). Further, for a plaintiff to state an
adequate claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant: (1) made a material omission, (2) with scienter, (3) in
connection with purchase or sale of securities, (4) that plaintiff relied on that omission, and
(5) that the omission caused plaintiff economic loss. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2021)). If such a showing can be made, nondisclosure may also prove costly to
companies.
215. Langevoort, supra note 177, at 1013.
216. See id. at 980.
217. See id. at 975. But see Ferrell, supra note 132, at 85 (explaining the traditional
counterargument that “[i]n a world in which a firm has private information about the quality
of its product and disclosure is costless, firms will voluntarily publicly disclose their private
information as a signal of their products’ quality”); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 145, at
853 (noting that even if disclosure requirements imparted some real costs on companies,
“[corporations] generally already have low-cost access to the information . . . [and]
[u]ndoubtedly, firms can obtain this information at lower cost than can shareholders or
researchers”).
218. See Langevoort, supra note 177, at 975. But see Alex Edmans et al., The Real Costs
of Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 6, 2013),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/11/06/the-real-costs-of-disclosure/
[https://perma.cc/VZJ7-RH4S] (“[T]here may be costs of producing information. However,
firms already produce copious information for internal or tax purposes.”).
219. See Langevoort, supra note 177, at 975.
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the more nuanced argument, weighing the inevitable implications of any
imperfect standard, while ultimately concluding that the most prominent
downside of the current framework is that it is too weak. While this approach
is undoubtedly critical of current SST disclosure requirements, it argues for
the continuation and reinforcement of the existing framework rather than for
abandoning such disclosure mechanisms altogether.
III. ESTABLISHING A UNIFORM STANDARD: ENACTING AN SST-SPECIFIC
REGULATION S-K PROVISION
This Note proposes that the SEC add a more precise provision under
Regulation S-K that mandates disclosure of all SST-related activities.220 The
guiding premise of this resolution is that investors care about—and indeed
demand—SST disclosures.221 This resolution accepts that transparency
through SST disclosure is inherently beneficial in advancing compelling
interests.222 However, current SST disclosure requirements need greater
exactitude to be more effective.223 This proposal continues the existing
benefits associated with SST disclosure addressed in Part II.A, while
eliminating many of the issues raised in Part II.B. Further, although this
proposed solution does not resolve all underlying SST disclosure issues, such
as the notion that SST disclosures should not be regulated by the SEC in the
first place,224 it does remediate the somewhat ineffective nature of the current
requirements.225
Part III.A formulates the guidelines of a more effective proposal for
standardizing SST disclosure requirements based on the overarching pitfalls
of the current disjointed requirements. Part III.B analyzes the strengths of a
more uniform standard under Regulation S-K. Part III.C considers the
possible weaknesses inherent in this proposal.
A. Developing an Effective Regulation S-K Provision
The critical issue plaguing SST disclosure standards in their current form
is that there are so many different mechanisms used to solicit disclosures
from corporations, and consequently, the utility of SST disclosure is difficult
to assess.226 First, there is no clear standard for what SST activities must be
disclosed.227 Second, there is no singular disclosure mechanism lending

220. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the existing requirements of Regulation S-K).
221. See supra Part II.A.2.
222. See supra Part II.A.1.
223. See supra Part II.C.1.
224. See supra Part II.B.1.
225. See supra Part II.B.2.
226. See supra Parts I.B.1–4 (discussing the materiality standard, specific provisions in
Regulation S-K, targeted disclosure by means of comment letters, and the ITRA).
227. See supra Parts I.B.1–4 (discussing the varying disclosure requirements under each of
the four mechanisms).
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consistency to the disclosures that are solicited.228 Together, these issues
muddy any existing clarity regarding SST disclosure requirements, leading
to patchy disclosure standards that lack uniformity.
The various channels and standards for disclosure mechanisms cause
significant discrepancies in the resulting SST disclosures: the traditional
materiality standard requires corporations to disclose only information that
would be considered important to reasonable investors,229 a standard that
affords some deference to the interpretations of the corporations
themselves.230 Regulation S-K takes a slightly more exacting approach,
mandating particular (yet still notably broad) line-item disclosure
requirements.231 The comment letter method solicits disclosures in a
significantly different manner, with the DCF affirmatively requesting
information on highly specific matters, without notable concern for
materiality.232 Lastly, disclosures solicited via legislation under the ITRA
differ from the aforementioned methods in that the legislation only applies to
Iran but makes no exception for de minimis information, thus rejecting the
materiality standard.233 The only thing that is clear is that the many standards
require inconsistent information with different degrees of deference to
corporations’ own determinations.
There is understandable ambiguity regarding disclosures in this sphere:
Are activities with SSTs inherently meaningful to investors and thus
material?234 Or, do the various arguments by corporations—that certain
SST-related activities are unimportant235 or that these disclosures, when
compelled, unfairly “blacklist” corporations—defeat a presumption of
materiality?236 These questions give rise to the second principal issue
plaguing the effectiveness of current SST disclosures: because there is no
overarching governance between the various standards, these standards fail
to produce a uniform set of disclosures.237 If a singular mechanism
governing SST disclosure (for instance, if disclosure was only solicited via
comment letters) existed, the authority governing the disclosure could
quickly resolve these discrepancies (or more likely, discrepancies would not
exist in the first place).

228. See supra Parts I.B.1–4 (explaining that there are four principle disclosure
mechanisms in this space).
229. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (defining the materiality standard that
has evolved under judicial decisions and SEC interpretation).
230. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining that many corporations determine their own
interactions with SSTs to be immaterial).
231. See supra Part I.B.2.
232. See supra Part I.B.3; e.g., supra text accompanying notes 97–100.
233. See supra Part I.B.4.
234. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 134.
235. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., supra note 187.
237. See supra Part II.C (discussing the potential for SST disclosures to be effective, if not
for the current lack of clarity surrounding existing requirements).
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Therefore, this Note proposes that Regulation S-K adopt a new item
requiring disclosure of all of a corporation’s dealings with SSTs. This
proposal unifies the competing standards so that investors have access to
clear, consolidated SST disclosures if investors choose to seek out this
information. Moreover, a Regulation S-K line-item requirement would
ensure not only that the information is readily available but that all
corporations are held to the same SST disclosure standard. In this sense, the
proposed Regulation S-K item incorporates the “no de minimis exception”
aspect of the ITRA,238 requiring sweeping disclosure requirements in the
SST sphere.
B. Primary Strengths of the Proposed Solution
This Regulation S-K addition achieves multiple benefits in SST disclosure
practices. Part III.B.1 examines how the creation of a more specific
requirement—overriding the deferential standard of materiality—eliminates
confusion, increases exactitude, and leads to a more coherent set of SST
disclosures from corporations. Part III.B.2 explains how this Regulation S-K
requirement would effectively carry on, and in certain instances advance, the
current benefits arising from SST disclosure practices.
1. Avoiding Conflicting Interpretations of Materiality
This proposal resolves existing conflicts in the SST disclosure debate by
reconciling, or at least circumventing, the disparate understandings of
“materiality” as the term applies to SSTs. As described in this Note, while
some argue that interactions with SSTs, due to their inherent ties to terrorism,
are material to all investors, others contend that there are instances where a
corporation’s interactions with SSTs are of little importance.239 This Note’s
proposal requires disclosure of all business dealings with SSTs, eliminating
conflicting interpretations of materiality that produce inconsistent
interpretations. Importantly, however, this proposal does not purport to label
all SST interactions material. Such a suggestion would likely receive
backlash from critics who have already asserted that, for various reasons,
many interactions with SSTs are immaterial.240 Further, an attempt to
continue to solicit SST disclosures under the guise of materiality would
inevitably fall short of capturing all important information, just as
materiality-based disclosures currently do.241

238. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
239. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003) (taking the position that all
interactions with SSTs matter to investors), with SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 3
(describing situations in which SST interactions would be immaterial). See also supra text
accompanying notes 134, 177.
240. See supra Part II.B.2.
241. See supra Part II.B.2.
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This solution also avoids the adoption of a “materiality per se” approach,
which would necessarily deem all SST interactions as material.242
Materiality per se is a slippery argument in and of itself: the notion as applied
to SSTs argues that all interactions with SSTs will matter to investors. This
idea is inherently incorrect, and adopting such an approach would gloss over
the underpinnings of the materiality standard.243 Inevitably, some dealing
with SSTs will be so monetarily small or relationally removed from a
corporation’s business that those dealings will not matter to a reasonable
investor. To apply a sweeping label of “materiality” to these dealings would
be fundamentally wrong and would mangle traditional understandings of
materiality.
Adopting a line-item requirement in Regulation S-K that mandates the
disclosure of all SST-related business is, therefore, beneficial because it
avoids the materiality standard altogether. Moreover, in rejecting a
materiality per se approach, a Regulation S-K line item avoids undermining
existing understandings of materiality in securities law. This enhances the
consistency of the existing inconsistent disclosure standards because much
of the current debate concerns how to appropriately determine materiality
when it comes to terrorism-adjacent activities. After all, the aim of this Note
is to propose a remedy that creates more effective and coherent regulations
in the SST-disclosure space. The necessary first step is to depart from
materiality, a standard that yields inconsistent disclosure in a space rife with
varying views on the importance of the implications of terrorism.
2. Continuing Benefits Afforded by SST Disclosure
The heightened specificity of a new line-item requirement in Regulation
S-K will also enhance the quality and quantity of SST disclosures by
compelling corporations to reveal more information. In turn, an addition to
Regulation S-K allows for the continued benefits associated with SST
disclosure expressed in Part II.B—namely, ensuring transparency that
benefits the investors the disclosures serve,244 fulfilling demonstrated
investor demand for such information,245 and contributing to socially
beneficial practices achieved via the public scrutiny that accompanies
disclosure.246
To begin, SST disclosure requirements benefit the market through their
information-forcing capabilities.247 This notion aligns with Former
Chairman Cox’s strongly held view that the SEC’s role is to make

242. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 169–70 (discussing arguments in favor of
preserving the “integrity” of the standard).
244. See supra Part II.A.1.
245. See supra Part II.A.2.
246. See supra Part II.A.3.
247. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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information more readily available for the investing public.248 A clearer,
more exacting, and more consistent disclosure requirement functions to
further these goals by ensuring that corporations provide pertinent
information to the investing public as part of their regular disclosures.249 The
ultimate proposal of this Note increases transparency, which is a key feature
of a disclosure-based regime.250 Transparency is even more desirable, given
the existing evidence of investor demand for SST disclosures.251 Not only
does a more precise standard for SST disclosures standardize the subsequent
disclosures, it also increases transparency, benefitting both investors252 and
the efficiency of the market as a whole.253
A comprehensive Regulation S-K requirement resolves many of the
critiques described above,254 enacting a clearer standard that increases
exactitude.255 In turn, this proposal eliminates much of the ineffectiveness
caused by inconsistent and unclear practices and ensures that the benefits
associated with SST disclosures continue in the future.
C. Possible Weaknesses of This Proposed Solution
Despite the benefits of a Regulation S-K addition requiring disclosure of
all business in or with SSTs, this proposal will necessarily face criticism.
Critics who are diametrically opposed to the SEC overseeing disclosures that
are not traditionally financial in nature will denounce this solution as it
maintains the status quo—the SEC continues as the principal regulator of
SST disclosures.256 This criticism is further analyzed in Part III.C.1. Part
III.C.2 explains an additional pitfall of this proposal: requiring heightened
disclosures can be costly, creating the possibility of fraud liability for
information that is not of any notable importance otherwise and for
information that companies would not be compelled to disclose in the
absence of heightened disclosure requirements.257

248. See Press Release, supra note 67; see also supra text accompanying note 127.
249. See generally supra note 69.
250. See supra notes 128–38 and accompanying text.
251. See supra Part II.A.2. Moreover, given that there is a demand for this information,
greater consistency in solicitation is a desirable goal. Insufficient or inconsistent disclosure
will always fall short of investor demand, whether investors are aware of the deficiencies of
the disclosures or not. A Regulation S-K requirement thus serves to better fulfill investor
demand than existing disclosure mechanisms do.
252. See supra note 16 (establishing the interests of investors as the principal concern of
this Note).
253. See generally supra text accompanying notes 130–32.
254. See, e.g., supra Parts II.B.2, II.C (detailing the risk of ineffectiveness in current
standards).
255. See supra Part II.B.2.
256. See supra Part II.B.1.
257. See supra Part II.C.2.
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1. Maintaining Regulation of SSTs Under the SEC
A weakness of this Note’s proposal is that it fails to address the more
sweeping concern that SST disclosure requirements are inherently
problematic because the SEC should not regulate in this sphere.258 Any
proposal seeking to retain some semblance of the current SST disclosure
framework would fall victim to the same parallel critiques: that the SEC is
an inappropriate regulator and that there are other agencies better suited to
the task.259 Given the compelling interests in retaining SST disclosure
mechanisms in some form,260 it is difficult to propose a practical solution that
would entirely eliminate this criticism. The SEC, whether by the broad
mandates of the materiality standard or the more narrowly tailored methods
of comment letters and legislation pertaining to SST disclosure specifically,
will likely continue to regulate in this sphere regardless.
Nevertheless, the solution proposed by this Note at least cabins the
authority of the SEC’s focus on a “political or foreign policy agenda.”261
Specifically delineating a disclosure standard under Regulation S-K confines
the SEC’s currently murky disclosure-forcing capabilities to notions of
materiality disclosure already expressed in Regulation S-K.262 This solution
ensures that the SEC continues to act consistently with its traditional agenda
of overseeing disclosure of material information.263
2. Creating Costs for Companies Through Fraud Liability
As explained in Part II.C.2, necessary considerations in any disclosure
mechanism are the associated costs.264 These may include costs associated
with gathering information265 and, inevitably, some degree of omissions
liability where companies fail to disclose information that might be
considered material to investors.266 However, a proposal that creates a
Regulation S-K item that specifically gives rise to heightened SST disclosure
requirements necessarily implicates additional costs: costs associated with
the increased risk of fraud liability.
Again, when corporations disclose risk factors, they create statements on
the basis of which fraud claims can be brought.267 This liability would not
otherwise exist in a system where disclosure of certain information is not
258. See supra Part II.B.1.
259. See supra Part II.B.1.
260. See supra Parts II.A.1–3.
261. Lynn, supra note 93, at 351.
262. See supra Part II.B.2.
263. See Lynn, supra note 93, at 351.
264. See supra Part II.C.2.
265. But see supra note 217 (explaining that these costs are relatively low, as companies
already have access to their own information). See also Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 145,
at 853.
266. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
267. See Langevoort, supra note 177, at 1014; see also supra notes 207–13 and
accompanying text.
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mandated. For example, the proposed addition to Regulation S-K requires
disclosure of all business in or with SSTs. This compels disclosure of certain
statements that are neither currently captured under the provisions of
materiality and existing items in Regulation S-K nor solicited via comment
letters or the ITRA268 because the proposed standard requires more
information mandated with greater specificity. In turn, any misstatement in
these disclosures, no matter how small or immaterial, risks fraud liability,
and companies will inevitably face greater costs. Such liability risk does not
exist under current standards to this same degree because current standards
do not mandate such sweeping disclosures. Nevertheless, as discussed in
Part II.C.2, costs of some form are inherent in any disclosure mechanism.
This proposal therefore accepts increased fraud liability as a necessary hurdle
in achieving more consistent SST disclosure practices.
CONCLUSION
This Note first addressed the designation of SSTs in the world: Syria, Iran,
North Korea, and Cuba.269 Then, this Note identified four different
mechanisms that the SEC uses to solicit SST disclosures from corporations:
the materiality standard, the provisions of Regulation S-K, comment letter
solicitations, and requirements of the ITRA.270 The various standards at
play, and their varying degrees of exactitude in the disclosures they require,
create a disjointed framework for SST disclosure requirements. Therefore,
although SST disclosures theoretically ensure transparency, fulfill an
existing investor demand, and lead to socially beneficial practices,271 the
existing standards are not successfully accomplishing these aims because
they are too inconsistent to produce a meaningful set of information.
Developing a singular, cohesive standard that ensures that corporations
make SST disclosures and that these disclosures are meaningful when
compared to one another is critical to developing an effective disclosure
system in the SST sphere. An addition to Regulation S-K that unifies the
existing mechanisms under one heightened requirement to disclose all
business in or with SSTs solves many of these problems. Although critics
may be discontented with such a recommendation,272 this proposal maintains
SST oversight under the umbrella of the SEC in a way that creates a stronger
and fairer standard and introduces clarity to a discussion currently plagued
with inconsistencies. It is time for a clearer standard in SST disclosure.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See supra Parts I.B.1–4.
See supra Part I.A.2.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.1.

